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COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES, no. 62, 2nd quarter 2006, p. 147. 
The Scope of Economic Sector Regulation  
in Electronic Communications 
Alexandre de STREEL ACKNOLO (*) 
Faculty of Economics, University of Namur 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper proposes a market-based approach relying on a combination of 
selection criteria and antitrust methodology to determine the scope of economic regulation 
and its balance with competition law. It suggests a clarified three criteria test related to the 
presence of high non-transitory and non-strategic entry barriers that are mainly of an 
economic nature, the absence of dynamic competition behind those barriers and a cross-
checking criterion related to the insufficiency of antitrust remedies to solve the identified 
problems. The paper recalls the importance of using use antitrust methodology adapted to 
the characteristics of the sector and also suggests some clarification of the regulation of 
emerging markets. This article draws a distinction between retail services and the 
underlying wholesale infrastructures, and proposes that all wholesale access products 
used for the provision of similar retail services should be dealt with in the same way, 
independently of the infrastructures in question (the old copper pair or an upgraded VSDL 
network). The paper concludes that only wholesale access products used to provide new 
retail services should possibly escape regulation. 
Key words: Regulation, electronic communications, market failures, balance between 
antitrust and sector regulation and emerging markets. 
 
his paper proposes an efficient test to determine the scope of 
economic regulation in the electronic communications sector and the 
balance between regulation and antitrust law. The suggested test is 
based on economic methodology, as well as its practice in the European 
Union.  
The first section of the paper studies the rationale for public intervention. 
It starts by listing the reasons for such intervention (market failures) and then 
characterises the differences between the means of intervention (sector 
regulation and antitrust law). The second section proposes a test to 
determine the scope of economic regulation by recalling the approaches 
                     
(*) Acknowledgements are made to Allan Bartroff, Richard Cawley, Peter Johnston, Paul 
Richards and the participants of the EuroCPR 2006 conference for their very helpful comments 
and discussions. 
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currently followed in Europe and in the United States, by advocating a 
particular option in the European context and a clarification of the regulation 
of emerging markets. The final section rounds up the paper with some 
conclusions. 
  Rationale for public intervention 
Market failures justifying public intervention 
It is generally agreed that public authorities should aim to maximise the 
welfare of their citizens and markets are supposed to be the best means to 
ensure such welfare maximisation. Thus, governments should intervene only 
when the functioning of markets does not deliver this objective. 
Economists distinguish between three types of market failure (See also 
Australian Productivity Commission, 2001; MOTTA, 2004, Chapter 2). The 
first type of failure is the presence of an excessive market power (such as a 
monopoly operator), which may lead to over-pricing and/or too little 
innovation. Excessive market power is mainly due to the presence of entry 
barriers. In economic literature, there are two opposing views (McAfee et al., 
2004; OECD, 2006) to the controversial concept of entry barriers. The 
narrow (Stiglerian) view limits the barriers to the absolute cost advantages of 
incumbents (such as access to the best outlets in town, the presence of 
consumer switching costs, or any type of legal barriers), but excludes all 
entrants' costs that have also been borne by incumbents (for instance high 
fixed and sunk costs 1). The broad (Bainian) view extends the concept of 
barriers to all factors that limit entry and enable incumbents to make a supra-
normal profit and hence includes absolute cost advantages, as well as 
economies of scale and scope. In telecommunications economics literature, 
this first market failure corresponds to the one-way access (or access) 
model, which concerns the provision of bottleneck inputs by an incumbent 
network provider to new entrants (ARMSTRONG, 2002; LAFFONT & 
TIROLE, 2000; VOGELSANG , 2003).  
                     
1 The European Regulators Group defines sunk costs as: "Costs which, once incurred, cannot 
be recouped, e.g. when exiting the market. Examples for sunk costs are transaction costs, 
advertising expenses or investment in infrastructure for which there is no or little alternative 
use': Revised Common Position of May 2006 on remedies ERG(06) 33, p. 127. 
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The second market failure is the presence of an externality (like network 
externality or tariffs-mediated externality), which may lead to under-
consumption in cases of positive externality and over-consumption in cases 
of negative externality 2. For instance, less than the optimal number of 
customers may decide to join a network if new customers are not 
compensated, when joining the network, for the increase in welfare that they 
offer existing customers. In telecommunications economics literature, this 
second market failure corresponds to two-way access (or the 
interconnection) model, which concerns reciprocal access between two 
networks that have to rely upon each other for call termination 
(ARMSTRONG, 2002; LAFFONT & TIROLE, 2000; VOGELSANG , 2003). 
The third market failure is the presence of information asymmetries (such 
as the absence of knowledge of price), which may lead to under or over 
consumption. For instance, the very high prices of international roaming may 
partly be due to insufficient knowledge of the price and techniques of such a 
service. 
In addition, each type of market failure may be structural and result from 
the supply and demand conditions of the market, or may be behavioural and 
artificially (albeit rationally) 'manufactured' by firms, leading to the two-by-two 
matrix illustrated below 3. Since the decline of the Structure-Conduct-
Performance paradigm in industrial economics, it is now recognised that 
structural and strategic market failures are closely linked and that market 
structure influences the conduct of firms as much as their conduct influences 
market structure (SUTTON, 1991). Yet it remains possible (and useful when 
choosing between the different instruments of public intervention) to identify 
the causes of non-efficient market results and to distinguish between 
structural and strategic market failures. 
However, this table is only a stylised and static view of the market and is 
consequently constitutes more of a starting point for raising relevant 
questions about the scope of public intervention, rather than a check list to 
provide definitive answers. Indeed, telecommunications markets are 
intrinsically dynamic and a rationale based on static view that does not 
sufficiently take into account investment incentives may lead to inappropriate 
                     
2 The European Regulators Group defines network externality as: "The effect which existing 
subscribers enjoy as additional subscribers join the network, which is not taken into account 
when this decision is made": ERG Revised Common Position on remedies, p. 126. 
3 Several potential behavioural market failures have been identified by the European 
Regulators Group in its Revised Common position on remedies at Chapter 2. 
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and over-inclusive public intervention. For instance, a high level of market 
power when taking a static view may be welfare enhancing when taking a 
dynamic view because it stimulates investment. Thus, it will not justify 
intervention, provided they are some constrains in the long term as 
explained by SCHUMPETER (1964) in the theory of creative destruction. 
Conversely, public intervention may be welfare detrimental from a static 
view, but welfare enhancing from a dynamic view. For instance, the support 
of less efficient entrants may be justified to give these players time to 
consolidate their customer base and become more efficient over time 4. 
Table 1 - Market failures susceptible to public intervention 
 Structural/non-strategic Behavioural/strategic 
 
Excessive market 
power 
One way access 
(access model) 
Cell 1 
- High and sunk fixed with uncertainty 
- Important absolute cost advantages 
(like switching costs, legal barriers) 
Cell 2 
- Reinforcement of dominance 
- Vertical leveraging 
- Horizontal leveraging 
Externality 
Two way access 
(interconnection 
model) 
Cell 3 
- Network effects 
- Two-sided markets 
 
Cell 4 
- Strategic network effects like 
loyalty program or tariff 
mediated externality 
Information 
asymmetry 
Cell 5 Cell 6 
Moreover, it is also important to look at the origin of market power and to 
intervene more stringently in the case of monopolies acquired under legal 
protection, but take a laxer approach to monopolies acquired under 
competitive conditions (there was competition for the market, although there 
is no competition in the market) along the lines of the 'original sin' rationale 5.  
                     
4 ERG Revised Common Position on remedies, p. 78 noting that: "In some cases however, 
'inefficient' (e.g. small-scale) entry might be desirable as short-run productive inefficiencies may 
be more than outweighed by the enhanced allocative efficiencies and long-run (dynamic) 
advantages provided by competition". See also the Annex of the ERG Revised Common 
Position on remedies and DG Competition Discussion Paper of December 2005 of Application 
of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, para 67. 
5 This view was defended in the Opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-7/97 
Bronner v MediaPrint [1998] ECR I-7791. It was also implicitly suggested by the European 
Commission at Article 13(2) of DG Information Society Working Document of April 27th 2000 on 
a Common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services available 
at: 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/maindocs/miscdocs/index_en.htm.  
This working document added the following text to the current definition of SMP:  "And, where 
(a) undertaking has financed infrastructure partly or wholly on the basis of special or exclusive 
rights which have been abolished, and there are legal, technical or economic barriers to market 
entry, in particular for construction of network infrastructure; or (b) the undertaking concerned is 
a vertically entity owning or operating network infrastructure for delivery of services to 
customers and also providing services over that infrastructure, and its competitors necessarily 
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The choice of legal instruments to deal with market failures 
To tackle these different market failures, public authorities dispose of 
several legal instruments (in particular competition law, sector regulation, 
consumer law) that they must combine in the most efficient way. In fact, the 
scope of each legal instrument varies across jurisdictions. 
In the European Union, the scope of competition law (Articles 81-86 EC) 
is independent of sector regulation. Competition law has a constitutional 
value and applies to all market segments. An antitrust authority may 
consequently intervene in addition to the intervention of a sectoral 
regulator 6. On the other hand, the scope of sector regulation 7 is dependent 
on competition law. Sector regulation applies when competition law 
remedies prove insufficient to solve a market failure problem (Recital 27 of 
the Framework Directive). However, it is difficult to determine when sector 
regulation has an added-value (i.e. is more efficient in dealing with market 
failure) compared to antitrust law because both instruments have converged 
over time in the electronic communications sector. Competition law has been 
applied extensively to maintain level competition, but also to increase such 
level 8 and has become a sort of 'regulatory antitrust'. Conversely, sector 
regulation is now based on antitrust methodologies 9 and has become sort of 
'premptive competition law' (CAVE & CROWTHER, 2005; de STREEL, 
2004). As KRÜGER & DI MAURO (2003: 36) observe: 
                     
require access to some of its facilities to compete with it in downstream market." (my 
underlining). 
6 Commission Decision of May 21st 2003, Deutsche Telekom, O.J. [2003] C 264/29, currently 
under appeal at the Court of First Instance as case T-271/03. In the United States, the Supreme 
Court decided in 2004 that antitrust would in practice not be applicable if sector regulation 
applies: Verizon v. Trinko 540 U.S. 682 (2004). For an analysis of the differences between  the 
USA and Europe, see Larouche, 2006. For an analysis of the relationship between antitrust and 
sector regulation in other jurisdictions, see GERADIN & KERF, 2003. 
7 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 7th 2002 on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(Framework Directive), O.J. [2002] L 108/33; Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of March 7th 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic 
communications networks and services (Access Directive), O.J. [2002] L 108/7; Directive 
2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 7th 2002 on universal 
service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal 
Service Directive), O.J. [2002] L 108/51. 
8 Such approach has been explicitly endorsed by the Court of First Instance: Case T-87/05 
Energias de Portugal v Commission [2005] ECR II-0000, para 91. 
9 To regulate an operator, a regulatory agency must delineate the border of the relevant 
markets with competition methodology (the hypothetical monopolist test), select the market 
according to the three criteria test, and determine whether the operator enjoys a dominant 
position (as defined in competition law) in the delineated and selected market. 
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"The perceived antagonism between competition and regulation is, 
therefore, only apparent, and it is destined to disappear. In fact, 
competition has already been shaping regulation: it is the latter which 
has been adapting itself to suit the philosophy and the approach of the 
former. Regulatory policy cannot be seen anymore as independent of 
competition policy: it must be seen as a part of a broader set of tools of 
intervention in the economy based on competition analysis principles. 
[…] competition instruments and regulatory tools are complementary, 
rather than substitute, means. They deal with a common problem and 
try to achieve a common aim. The problem is always high levels of 
market power and the likelihood of it being abused, and the aim is 
putting the end user at the centre of any economic activity. Only 
through a combination of both tools can we ensure that market power 
does not distort and hamper the development of competition in the 
communications markets. This in turn allows end users to drive and 
steer such development, as well as to benefit the most of it." 
In practice, the two main and related substantive differences between 
sector regulation and antitrust 10 are that (1) the former intervenes ex-ante, 
hence deals with unsatisfactory market structures whereas latter (with the 
exception of merger control, which is admittedly very important in the 
electronic communications sector) intervenes ex-post, and consequently 
deals with unsatisfactory behaviour 11 and (2) the burden of proof for sector 
regulation to intervene is lower than antitrust law. The main institutional 
difference is that (3) sector regulation is only applied by national authorities, 
whereas antitrust law is applied by national and European authorities (DG 
Competition).  
As a result of the first difference (related to structure and behaviour), it is 
efficient for sector regulation to deal with structural market failures and 
competition law to deal with behavioural ones. The second difference 
(related to the burden of proof) makes it efficient for the factor used to select 
markets for regulation to be set at a very high level because once a market 
area is selected, intervention is relatively easy. In other words, the selecting 
factor should ensure that regulation is limited to markets where the risks of 
type I errors (false condemnation) are low and the risks of type II errors 
(false acquittal) are high 12. This is all the more important since the costs of 
                     
10 On the differences between sector regulation and antitrust law, see also LAFFONT & 
TIROLE, 2000: 276-280; KATZ , 2004; TEMPLE LANG, 2006. 
11 Paradoxically, the sectoral remedies are mainly behavioural and not structural. 
12 I link here the burden of proof to intervene with the risks and the costs of type I and type II 
errors, following EVANS & PADILLA (2004) and references cited therein in footnote 5. 
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type I errors are significant in dynamic markets 13. Taking both arguments 
together, any possible regulation should be limited to cells 1 and 3 of table 1, 
i.e. structural market failures due to excessive market power and 
externalities. Finally, because of the third difference (related to institutional 
design), it might be justifiable for antitrust law to apply in addition to sector 
regulation in cases where NRAs have not performed their tasks 
adequately 14.  
  A test to determine the scope of sector regulation 
Two approaches to a general test 
This section of the paper focuses on a test for the first market failure 
(excessive market power or one-way access) and disregards a test for the 
second market failure (network effects or interconnection) to alleviate any 
confusion between two very different economic problems 15. The distinction 
between these two market failures is important because the first market 
failure may disappear over time in electronic communications and economic 
regulation could be limited to network affects. In the USA, for instance, some 
authors suggest that Congress should reform the Telecom Act and limit 
regulation to interconnection issues where there are few players, leaving all 
the other issues (like one-way access or interconnection with many players) 
to antitrust law 16.  
For the first market failure, there are two main approaches to translating 
this economic rationale into legal provisions. The first approach is a market-
based test and is currently followed in Europe. It relies on a combination of 
                     
13 HAUSMAN (1997) valued the delay of the introduction of voice messaging services from late 
1970s until 1988 at USD 1.27 billion per year by 1994, and the delay of the introduction of 
mobile service at USD 100 billion, large compared with the 1995 US global telecoms revenues 
of USD 180 billion/year. 
14 As was the case in the Deustche Telekom decision. 
15 For interconnection, many authors argue for a move towards a generalized bill and keep 
rule: DEGRABA, 2002; HORROCKS ,2005. 
16 See the Draft Bill of the Progress & Freedom Foundation proposing a blueprint for and U.S. 
Digital Age Communications Act, available at: http://www.pff.org/daca/. This can not necessarily 
be transposed in Europe due to the lower penetration rate of cable and the application of the 
calling party principle. 
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antitrust methodologies and additional criteria. Thus, regulators start by 
defining relevant retail markets according to antitrust methodologies 
(adapted to sector characteristics such as its dynamism) 17. In cases of 
excessive market power at a retail level, regulators move to the linked 
wholesale network access market(s) and select markets for possible 
regulation on the basis of three criteria that are deemed to indicate which 
markets are not efficiently policed by competition law: entry barriers, no 
dynamics behind the barriers, and the insufficiency of competition law 
remedies to deal with the perceived problem 18.  
Such an approach is praised by BUIGES (2004) and CAVE (2004) 
because it ensures flexibility (as antitrust principles are based on economic 
theory), legal certainty (as antitrust principles are based on over forty years 
of case-law) and harmonisation (as antitrust principles are strongly 
Europeanised) and should facilitate the transition towards the disappearance 
of economic regulation and a state of affairs where competition laws is solely 
remaining. However, this approach is criticised by LAROUCHE (2002:136-
140), DOBBS & RICHARDS (2004), and RICHARDS (2006) because it is 
overly complicated and may contain a bias towards more regulation. 
The second approach is an asset-based test and is currently adopted in 
the United States 19. It detects hard-core market power justifying regulation 
with alternative and supposedly more direct economic methods. Thus, 
regulators do not start at the retail level, but focus directly on wholesale 
network segments with high fixed and sunk costs that make them unlikely to 
be replicable. One variant is the non-replicable asset defined as (1) an asset 
that has not already been replicated on a commercial basis in similar 
circumstances, and (2) with no functionally equivalent commercially viable 
and being able to deliver comparable services to end-users 20. Another 
                     
17 On this approach, see the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission Recommendation 
on relevant markets, section 3.1. 
18 Recitals 9-16 of the Commission Recommendation 2003/311 of February 11th 2003 on 
relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to 
ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services, OJ [2003] L 114/45. 
19 Note that the ERG Revised Common position on remedies refers to the non-replicable asset 
approach at p. 57-59 and the Recital 13 of the Access Directive links the need of regulation with 
the presence of bottleneck. 
20 Indecent and Ovum (2005: 26). In practice, the authors considered that this test implies 
regulation for to the fixed local loop in all Member States and might also include backhaul 
facilities from the Main Distribution Frame to the core network in some Member States. 
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broader (i.e. including more assets for regulation) variant is the bottleneck 
defined as: "The parts of the network where there are little prospects for 
effective and sustainable competition in the medium term." 21  
In the end, both approaches are less different than they may seem at a 
first sight, as they pursue the same goal of identifying the 'parts of the 
infrastructure' that justify regulation due to their structural characteristics. 
Yet, the starting point is different and the first approach may be a little more 
complicated, and thus more easily manipulated. On that basis, the first-best 
option and most efficient test may be an asset-based approach. However, 
this test would not be able to cover two-way access problems, which might 
remain the only area of regulation in the long term. It also requires some 
qualification to ensure that retail markets and the principle of technological 
neutrality are duly taken into account. In addition in the specific context of 
the European Union, regulators are now used to the market-based approach 
and such an approach justifies stringent control by the Commission over 
NRAs' decisions because it relies on antitrust methodology, an area of 
Commission expertise. In this specific context, this paper submits that the 
market-based approach is a second-best that should be maintained. 
However, it should be clarified. 
A reformed and clarified market-based test 
The market-based approach needs to be clarified at two levels: in terms 
of the use of antitrust methodologies and of the three criteria test. On the 
one hand, antitrust principles and their underlying economic theories should 
be adapted to the characteristics of the legal instrument and the markets 
conditions: for vertical chain of production, for Schumpeterian competition 
and for two-sided markets. 
                     
21 Ofcom Final statements of September 22nd 2005 on the Strategic Review of the 
Telecommunications and undertakings in lieu of a reference under the Enterprise Act 2002, at 
Para 4.6. Currently Ofcom considers that this test implies regulation for shared and full metallic 
path facility, wholesale line rental, backhaul extension services, Wireless Access Network 
extension services and IPstream. The bottleneck approach was also favoured by SQUIRE-
SANDERS & ANALYSYS (1999: 147). They did not define the concept, but pragmatically 
identified interconnection (especially termination practices), access to networks or digital 
gateways, local loop, distribution and access to scarce resources. For the (then) future, they 
also identified intellectual property rights, directory services, programming guides, and control 
over interfaces/web navigators. In his doctoral dissertation, LAROUCHE (2000: 359-402) also 
proposed to base regulation on the concepts of bottleneck and network effects. 
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On the other hand, the three criteria test should be qualified 22. (1) The 
first criterion would be related the presence of entry barriers. As we have 
already seen, there are different conceptions of entry barriers and 
Schmalensee (2004:471) argues that the appropriate notion of entry barriers 
depends on the objectives of the legal instrument for which it is used. He 
submits that a Bainian approach is preferable for antitrust law pursuing the 
maximisation of consumer welfare 23. For the same reason, a Bainian 
approach should be used in sector regulation. Indeed, the European 
Regulators Group defines the barriers to entry as:  
"An additional cost which must be borne by entrants but not by 
undertakings already in the industry; or other factors which enable an 
undertaking with significant market power to maintain prices above the 
competitive level without inducing entry". (ERG Revised Common 
Position on remedies, p. 124)  
Yet, such a notion needs to be qualified before being used as the first 
criterion to screen a market for regulation. Firstly, the barriers should be 
structural because strategic barriers (like excessive investment or 
reinforcement of network effects) would require idiosyncratic and episodic 
intervention that is better left to competition law (CAVE, 2004: 34).  
Secondly, the barriers should be non-transitory because transient 
barriers do not justify heavy-handed intervention by sector regulators. The 
timeframe of what is 'transitory' is difficult to decide, but should at least cover 
the period until the next market review (a minimum of 2 to 3 years) and 
possibly beyond (ERG Revised Common Position on remedies, p. 59).  
Thirdly, the barriers should principally be of an economic nature. Indeed, 
if the barriers are of a legal nature (such as a limitation of spectrum that 
cannot be traded), the best remedy consists of removing the barrier and not 
                     
22 If the tests were followed, the Commission Recommendation on relevant market would be 
substantially slimmed down. The retail markets, the fixed core network markets and most of the 
mobile markets would be removed, meaning that only the fixed terminating segments and the 
fixed and mobile interconnection markets would be identified for further analysis by NRAs. 
23 Thus, the Commission proposes a broad definition of entry barriers, stating that: "Factors 
that make entry impossible or unprofitable while permitting established undertakings to charge 
prices above the competitive level." This includes many elements like economies of scale and 
scope, capacity constraints, absolute cost advantages, privileged access to supply, highly 
developed distribution and sales networks, the established position of the incumbent firms in 
markets, legal barriers, and other strategic barriers to entry: Discussion Paper on exclusionary 
abuses, para 38-40. 
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regulating the artificially uncompetitive market 24. In such cases, the 
regulator would do better to advocate rather than intervene in the market, 
and to lobby the public authorities (legislator, government etc.) to remove 
legal barriers instead of regulating the market. Thus it is only if, and for the 
period when, there is no way of removing such legal barriers that the market 
may be selected for regulation. 
Fourthly and most importantly, the barriers should be so high that no 
effective competition may be expected. The difficult question here is how 
'high' is high? The issue is whether a 'natural' tight oligopoly should be 
regulated 25. To alleviate any type 1 error, this paper submits that the entry 
barriers should be so high that only one operator, except in exceptional 
circumstances, can be profitable in the market. This paper does not contend 
that oligopolies should be regulated because the authorities do not have 
sufficient information to discriminate between efficient and inefficient 
oligopolies, or have efficient remedies for dealing with them under the sector 
regime 26 and most oligopoly situations could be resolved by removing legal 
entry barriers.  
Thus, the first criterion would cover non-transitory and non-strategic entry 
barriers that are mainly of an economic nature and that should be so high 
that only one operator is viable in the market,  save exceptional 
circumstances. To make the criterion operational, the regulatory players 
could opt for a two-stage approach 27. They could start with an empirical 
analysis and look at the degree to which operators in Europe or worldwide 
have built out competitive networks in similar circumstances and under 
viable economic conditions. Regulators could subsequently complement this 
finding with a cost analysis based on engineering models that estimate the 
cost curve or econometric cost functions (GASMI et al., 2002; FUSS & 
WAVERMAN, 2002). In practice, only some fixed segments may be 
                     
24 Indeed, the European Commission is encouraging a more flexible and marked-based 
approach for the allocation and the exchange of spectrum: Communication from the 
Commission of September 6th 2005 on a Forward-looking radio spectrum policy for the 
European Union, COM (2005) 411. 
25 As suggested by the E/IRG response to the 2006 Review, p. 22. 
26 In general, remedies include transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, 
compulsory access, price control and cost accounting: Articles 9-13 of the Access Directive. 
27 As proposed by CAVE (2006: 227). See also ERG Revised Common Position on remedies, 
pp. 59-60. 
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screened for one-way access regulation and no mobile segments, save 
exceptional circumstances 28. 
The second criterion would ensure that a dynamic view is adopted and 
correct the static bias that the first criterion may carry. Thus regulators 
should assess whether the market would deliver the results of dynamic 
competition (i.e. innovation) despite high entry barriers; in other words, 
whether the market would deliver the benefits of Schumpeterian creative 
destruction. This may be the case, for instance, if there is ex-ante 
competition for the market, although there is no more ex-post competition in 
the market 29. This should, however, be applied in a nuanced way. TIROLE 
(2004: 262) argues that if a monopoly is due to a legal monopoly, scale 
economies or pure network externalities, intervention is justified whereas if 
monopoly is due to genuine investment and innovation, regulators should 
forbear. 
The third criterion would ensure that a market is selected for regulation 
solely in cases where antitrust remedies prove less efficient than sector 
regulation to solve the identified dynamic competitive problem and recall that 
sector regulation is subsidiary to competition law. This criterion should be 
based on the same structural elements as the first two criteria and be fulfilled 
when these criteria are met (i.e. when there are high entry barriers that do 
not deliver the dynamic benefit of competition) serving solely as a cross-
check. This paper does not contend that the third criterion should be based 
on additional institutional elements (like the respective powers of the national 
competition authority relative to the national sector regulator) because such 
elements can vary from Member State to State, and could consequently 
undermine the consistency of regulation in the single market 30. 
A complementing clause for emerging markets 
This general screening test should complemented by clear provision 
regarding the treatment of emerging markets given the importance of 
                     
28 For a discussion of one-way access obligation in the mobile sector: ERGAS et al.,2005; 
VALETTI, 2004. 
29 One of the first economists to argue this point was DEMSETZ (1968). 
30 See similarly in the parallel issue of the relationship between the ex ante merger control and 
ex post control of abuse of dominant position: TetraLaval C-12/03P [2005] not yet reported, 
para 75. 
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investment in the sector and of legal certainty for investors. To be sure, the 
screening test based on three criteria test already contains an investment 
safeguard, as the second criterion relates to dynamic considerations. 
However, such a safeguard may not provide sufficient legal certainty for 
investors 31. 
To clarify the issue, the first step is to define an emerging market or 
service. The European Regulators Group defines the emerging market as:  
"Distinct from a market that is already susceptible to ex ante regulation 
from both a demand and a supply perspective. This means that 
consumers of the new service should not move their custom to 
currently available services in response to a small but significant non-
transitory price increase in the price of the new service. In a similar 
manner, firms currently providing existing services should not be in a 
position to quickly enter the new service market in response to a price 
increase" (ERG Revised Common Position on remedies, p. 19). 
The ERG notes that such markets will normally not be selected for 
regulation because it isn't possible to assess the three criteria test as there 
is a high degree of demand uncertainty and entrants to the market bear 
higher risk 32.  
To make the definition operational, it is useful to distinguish further 
between the retail services and the underlying infrastructures relied upon to 
provide such services. As far as retail markets are concerned, a new service 
does not emerge/exist when it can be included in a relevant existing market 
according to the hypothetical monopolist test 33. This is the case when end-
users consider the new service as substitutable for existing services, hence 
the new service provider is constrained in its prices (cf. box 1 of table 2). 
This is the case with Voice over Broadband, for instance, now that it permits 
                     
31 In any case a test based on non-replicability or bottlenecks contains nothing to protect new 
investment. 
32 Similarly, Indepen & Ovum (2005: 3) define an emerging market as: "Any relatively new 
market in which there is insufficient information (for example in terms of demand, pricing, price 
elasticity and entry behaviour) to carry out the necessary market definition procedures and/or 
tests as to whether the market is susceptible to ex ante regulation". BAAKE et al. (2005: 22) 
take: "As the necessary condition for a new market the existence of an innovation, i.e. an 
increase in general knowledge regarding the possibility of manufacturing or distributing goods 
and services." 
33 As noted by many like RICHARDS (2006), the application of the SSNIP test to emerging 
markets is complex because little information is available. 
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nearly the same functionalities as voice over PSTN 34. Conversely, a new 
service is considered to be emerging when this service cannot be included in 
a relevant existing market because end-users do not consider that this new 
service substitutes existing services (cf. box 2). This may be the case with 
the next generation of mobile broadband data services providing end users 
with internet access through a fast connection and with the added feature of 
mobility (ERG Revised Common Position on remedies, p. 20) or extremely 
fast fixed broadband access. 
Table 2: Different cases of emerging markets (*) 
 Existing services Emerging services R 
E 
T 
A 
I 
L 
 Box 1 (incl. VoIP) 
No regulation in principle 
Box 2 
No regulation 
Existing transmission 
inputs 
Box 3 
Apply standard SMP regime 
(market-based or asset-
based approach) 
----------- 
Mixed new 
transmission inputs 
Box 4 (incl. VDSL, FTTx) 
Market-based approach: as in Box 3 for existing services 
Asset-based approach: as in Box 5 for existing and emerging 
services 
 
 
W 
H 
O 
L 
E 
S 
A 
L 
E 
Totally new 
transmission inputs 
----------- Box 5 
No regulation OR access 
holidays, depending of the 
characteristics of the new 
infrastructure 
(*) This figure, which distinguishes between existing and new retail markets and between 
existing and new wholesale inputs, is adapted from a presentation that R. Cawley did at the 
CICT conference in Copenhagen in December 2005. For an alternative view, see Ovum & 
Indepen (2005). 
In terms of the wholesale inputs, there are three possibilities. An 
infrastructure may exist (and possibly have been deployed under a legal 
monopoly) and be used to provide existing retail services (cf. box 3). This is 
the case of the PSTN network. Alternatively, an upgraded infrastructure or a 
new infrastructure may be used to provide both existing and new retail 
services (cf. box 4). This is the case with the VDSL or even the Fiber To The 
Curb or To The Home network (FTTx). Finally, a new infrastructure may be 
used solely to provide emerging retail services (cf. box 5). This was the case 
                     
34 Annex of the Communication from the Commission of 6 February 2006 on Market Reviews 
under the EU Regulatory Framework: Consolidating the internal market for electronic 
communications, COM(2006) 28, p. 4. 
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with the 2G network when digital mobile voice was launched at the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
Once the emerging markets have been defined, the second step is to 
decide upon the optimal level of regulation required in order to preserve 
investment incentives 35. With regard to retail market regulation, existing 
services (box 1) should, in principle, be left to competition and sector 
regulation phased out, possibly accompanied by a safeguard period to 
ensure that regulation at the wholesale level is efficient in removing barriers 
to retail entry. Emerging services (box 2) that entail a much higher risk 
should be left to antitrust law alone 36.  
With regard to the regulation of wholesale inputs, the case of existing 
transmission infrastructures (box 3) is not controversial. These inputs should 
be subject to the standard three criteria test. Once this test is passed, NRAs 
may analyse further and possibly regulate the existing transmission inputs. 
The case of totally new transmission inputs is not very controversial 
either, although it should rarely happen in practice. There are two 
hypotheses (box 5) 37. The input does not, and will not in the future, meet 
the conditions of the screening test. In such circumstances, there is no need 
to intervene because the market is emerging, and more importantly, 
because there is no hard-core market power that justifies regulation. 
Alternatively, the totally new transmission input may, in the future, meet 
the conditions of the screening test. This situation is trickier because on the 
one hand there is hard-core market power that may justify regulation, but on 
the other hand, investment incentives need to be preserved 38. Regulators 
may adopt a radical approach and guarantee the operator 'access holidays' 
for a certain period of time, like an intellectual property right. The optimal 
                     
35 See also Ofcom, March 7th 2006, New Generation Networks: Developing the regulatory 
framework. 
36 This was the case with the ADSL tariffs in the Commission Decision of July 16th 2003, case 
38.233 Wanadoo. 
37 Another sub-category may also be created between new infrastructures put in place by 
incumbents and by new entrants, although such a distinction may not be relevant. 
38 It can be argued that regulation will not impede the recoupment of investment risk (hence will 
not undermine future investment incentives), as any access regulation (and access price) 
should provide a premium for investment risk. However, the calculation of this premium is far 
from simple, as regulators face difficulties in distinguishing the ex post rewards for risky 
investment from monopoly rents, hence there is a possibility that the premium will be set too 
low. On this point, see Australian Productivity Commission (2001: 268). 
162   No. 62, 2nd Q. 2006 
length of such access holidays is difficult to determine. Indepen & Ovum 
(2005) propose one third of the life of the asset 39, whereas BAAKE et al. 
(2005) propose a multiple stage approach whereby the situation is assessed 
every two to four years. Regulators may also be more interventionist and 
impose 'open access regulatory compacts' that leave operators the freedom 
to set the level of prices, but establish a structure of prices such that the 
operator can not foreclose its competitors in related markets 40. 
The most controversial case is the mixed new transmission inputs 
(box 4). Some (LAROUCHE, 2006) start at the retail level (i.e. at the top of 
figure 1) and adopt a 'vertical approach'. They argue that box 4 should be 
treated in the same way as box 3 for existing services. This is the view taken 
by the Commission and the European Regulators Group 41. Thus, regulators 
should deal equally with old and mixed new transmission inputs when they 
provide the same existing retail services. That may lead to further analysis, 
and possibly an imposition of remedies on the mixed new infrastructure, if 
the conditions of the three criteria test are met. For instance, if a VDSL line 
or a FTTH line replaces copper pairs, access regulation may continue to be 
imposed for the provision of existing retail services (like voice), but not for 
the provision of emerging services 42. However, NRAs should be cautious 
not to extend existing regulation to new inputs without an articulated 
economic analysis. Indeed, the fact that a mixed new infrastructure has been 
deployed may be an indication that there is no structural market failure 
justifying regulation altogether. 
                     
39 Based on GANS & KING, 2004. 
40 This is the approach followed in the Microsoft case, as the company is free to determine its 
price on the Operating System market, but it may not extend its monopoly from the OS market 
to related markets: Commission Decision of March 24th 2004, case 37.792 Microsoft. 
41 Commission Decision of December 23rd 2005, Case DE/2005/262 (Wholesale Broadband 
Access in Germany), available at: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/library. See 
also the ERG Revised Common Position on remedies, p. 116-118. Note that Commissioner 
Reding appears to have changed her mind about regulatory holidays. At the beginning, she 
seemed to be in favour of such approach to stimulate investment in new broadband 
infrastructure (REDING, 2005). Now on the basis of the data gathered in the 11th 
Implementation Report (Communication from the Commission of February 20th 2006, European 
Electronic Communications Regulation and Markets 2005 (11th Report), COM(2006) 68) and an 
independent study of London Economics (2006) done for the European Commission, she 
seems much more reluctant to accept regulatory holidays (REDING, 2006: 4). 
42 To ensure that investment in new infrastructure is not impeded, regulators may decide to 
regulate the access price of the mixed new infrastructure at retail minus (instead of cost plus 
based). 
A. de STREEL ACKNOLO 163 
Conversely, others (Indepen & Ovum, 2005) start at the wholesale level 
(i.e. at the bottom of figure 1) and adopt a 'horizontal' approach. They argue 
that box 4 should be treated in the same way as box 5. This is the view of 
the U.S. Federal Communications Commission 43. Thus the regulator should 
deal equally wit all new infrastructures, independently of the services for 
which they are used. For instance, if a VDSL line or a FTTH line replaces 
copper, access regulation will be lifted even to provide existing retail 
services (like voice). 
In practice 
To put these principles into practice, this paper suggests that regulators 
start by screening markets with the proposed market-based test to detect 
structural market failures due to excessive market power. In particular, 
regulators should assess whether the supposed market failures are 
detrimental to user welfare in the long run; and in cases of conflict between 
static and dynamic efficiencies, regulators should favour latter because 
dynamic gains and losses are generally more important than static gains and 
losses (de BIJL & PEITZ, 2002; Indepen & Ovum, 2005: 22).  
Regulators should then advance compelling arguments that the benefits 
of their intervention outweighs its cost. The benefit is the correction of the 
market failure and the consequent increase in welfare. The costs are the 
direct costs of designing and implementing the rules by the regulators and 
the regulatees and indirect costs due to type I errors (false condemnation), 
both of which are substantial in the electronic communications sector 44. As 
cost/benefit analyses are extremely difficult to perform, especially as they 
involve predictions of future market developments, a qualitative argument 
should suffice when quantitative analysis is not possible or far too 
burdensome 45.  
                     
43 Note, however, that the position of the FCC is mainly due to the important cable penetration 
in the USA, which has no equivalent in most of the EU Member States. 
44 For the direct costs of the implementation of the European regulation, Cave estimated at a 
CEPT conference in April 2005 that the average costs for the initial market review at 5 million 
Euros per Member State. Similarly, Australian Productivity Commission (2001) notes that the 
Australian incumbent is the biggest consumer of legal service in the country. For the indirect 
costs, see note 20. 
45 In particular when choosing remedies, the NRAs should carry a regulatory impact 
assessment showing that the anticipated benefits of the option selected outweigh its potential 
costs: Revised Common Position on remedies, p. 56. 
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  Conclusion 
To conclude, it is important that regulators have a clear and soundly 
economic-based test to determine the scope of economic regulation in the 
electronic communications sector and its optimal balance with competition 
law. This paper proposes a market-based approach relying on a combination 
of selection criteria and antitrust methodology to determine the scope of 
economic regulation. I suggest a clarified three criteria test related to the 
presence of high non-transitory and non-strategic entry barriers that are 
mainly of an economic nature, the absence of dynamic competition behind 
those barriers and a cross-checking criterion related to the insufficiency of 
antitrust remedies to solve the problems identified. It recalls the importance 
of using antitrust methodology adapted to relect the characteristics of the 
sector. The paper also proposes a clarification of the regulation of emerging 
markets and suggests drawing a distinction between retail services and 
underlying wholesale infrastructures. It also suggests that all wholesale 
access products used for the provision of similar retail services should be 
dealt with in the same way, independently of their infrastructure (the old 
copper pair or an upgraded VSDL network) and that only wholesale access 
products used to provide new retail services should possibly escape 
regulation. 
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